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1 Introduction 
The relationship between collective bargaining and worker participation has two main 
aspects  - 
•    the interaction between collective bargaining as a process (at workplace; sectoral and 
subsectoral level) and the process of worker participation through workplace forums 
and similar structures; and 
•    the demarcation of topics for collective bargaining from topics dealt with by workplace 
participatory structures. 
This article is concerned with the first aspect - the organizational and institutional sides of 
the process. 
Collective bargaining is widely accepted as the primary means of determining terms and 
conditions of employment. In South Africa its importance has been underlined by the legacy 
of deep adversarialism between organized labour and employers, the recent struggles of the 
trade union movement to achieve recognition and continued wariness on the part of unions 
against real or perceived attempts by employers to undermine their hard-won status. The 
right to bargain collectively has been written into the Constitution 1   and is guarded 
jealously in the workplace. In this polarized climate it is inevitable that trade unions will 
tend to view participatory structures as a potential threat, an instrument that may be used 
by employers to marginalize unions and avoid collective bargaining. Many employers, from 
their side, were and are concerned about perceived encroachments on their 
Sdecision-making powers threatened by employee participation and feel more comfortable 
with the familiar process of collective bargaining i which, at least, the independent roles of 
management and labour are clearly demarcated. 
A shop steward graphically sums up the mutual reservations of management and labour: 
 'But on some issues there were differing opinions; management fears that we, as workers, want to take control 
of the running of the factory. From our side we were suspicious of management because no matter what they 
may say, they are still white, they are the oppressors, and there will always be a hidden agenda 
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behind their promises. So instead of starting this change process with a good spirit, mistrust developed.' 2 
The government, when launching the bold idea of workplace forums, was well aware of the 
fears on both sides. The new law, the drafters of the LRA insisted, envisaged 'a clear and 
strict institutional separation between workplace forums and collective bargaining'. 
Workplace forums would be 'a secondary channel, supplementary to collective bargaining. It 
is vital to ensure that they do not replace collective bargaining or undermine trade unionism 
in any way'. 3 
But deep-rooted suspicions, feeding on a legacy of conflict, are not easily appeased. It is 
legitimate to consider to what extent such fears may be justified. Where industrial relations 
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are poor, suspicions may easily become self-fulfilling prophecies. Conflict may tend to 
permeate all forms of interaction, including would-be participatory processes. In the process 
workplace forums may conceivably be played off against shop stewards' committees, and 
vice versa. 
In practice, the establishment of participatory structures tends to take place very largely as 
a result of management initiatives or under management control, with trade unions 
accepting the process rather than being actively involved in shaping the outcome. Against 
this background, this chapter will examine the manner in which the LRA seeks to establish a 
stable division of labour between workplace forums and trade unions while maintaining the 
primacy of the latter. It will then look at the actual relationship between collective 
bargaining and worker participation, in respect of non-statutory structures as well as 
workplace forums, compared in both cases with the experience of works councils and trade 
unions in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
 
 
2 the Statutory Model 
(a) South Africa 
The LRA contains a battery of provisions aimed at giving effect to its vision of workplace 
forums harmoniously coexisting with trade unions within an environment determined by 
collective bargaining: 
 (a) Only a trade union or trade unions with majority membership in a workplace may 
apply to the CCMA for the establishment of a workplace forum (s 80(2)). 4 
 (b) Upon receiving such application a CCMA commissioner must seek to facilitate a 
collective agreement between the parties that will govern the operation of the 
workplace forum in its entirety 
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  and replace the provisions of chapter V (s 80(7)-(8)). The primary option, in other 
words, is a workplace forum created by collective agreement. 
 (c) If the parties cannot arrive at a collective agreement, the commissioner must seek 
to facilitate agreement on the constitution of the workplace forum (s 80(9)). 
 (d) If the applicant union or unions are recognized in terms of a collective agreement 
as collective bargaining agent(s) in respect of all employees in a workplace, such trade 
unions may choose the members of the workplace forum from among their elected 
representatives in the workplace in terms of their own constitutions (s 81). 
 (e) If the applicant union or unions cease to be representative and another union or 
unions achieve majority status, the latter will be entitled to demand a new election of the 
workplace forum (s 82(1)(f)). 
 (f) Any registered trade union with members at the workplace may nominate 
candidates for election to the workplace forum (s 82(1)(h)). The likely effect is that the 
applicant union or unions, given their majority membership among the workforce, will 
determine the composition of the workplace forum by putting forward their own nominees 
for election. 
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 (g) An applicant union or unions that nominated a member for election to a workplace 
forum may remove that member at any time (s 82(1)(i)). 
 (h) Office-bearers or officials of the applicant trade union or unions may attend any 
meeting of the workplace forum, including meetings with the employer or with employees (s 
82(1)(u)). 
 (i) The applicant union or unions and the employer may, by agreement, change any of 
the provisions of the constitution of workplace forum set out in paras (e) to (h) above (s 
82(1)(v)). 
 (j) If any of the statutory topics of consultation or joint decision-making are regulated 
5   by a collective agreement, they are automatically excluded from the agenda of the 
workplace forum and will continue to be regulated by collective agreement (ss 84(1), 
86(1)). 6 
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 (k) The applicant union or unions and the employer may by collective agreement add 
topics to the statutory agendas of consultation and joint decision-making (ss 84(3), 
86(3)(a)) and may also remove all or any of the topics from the agenda of joint 
decision-making (s 86(3)(b)). 7   Similarly, a bargaining council may add topics to 
the consultative agenda of workplace forums falling within its jurisdiction (s 84(2)). 
8 
 (l) The applicant union or unions may request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum. 
If more than 50% of employees taking part in the ballot vote for dissolution, the 
workplace forum will be dissolved (s 93). 
As matters stand, therefore, trade union control over workplace forums would seem to be 
all but complete. Workplace forums can only exist if majority trade unions wish them to 
exist, and can be dissolved at the behest of the same unions. Their members are likely to be 
union nominees. While they exist, their powers are by definition confined to areas not 
covered by collective agreements, trade unions have the right to be involved in all their 
activities and every aspect of their existence can be regulated by collective bargaining to 
the exclusion of the LRA. They are, in essence, creatures of trade unions and collective 
bargaining rather than creatures of statute. 
The Minister of Labour has, however, recently given notice of a potentially far-reaching 
change to chapter V of the Act. Pointing out that '[f]ewer than 20 workplace forums have 
been set up in terms of the LRA', the minister went on to make a statement that could 
herald a transformation of the manner in which workplace forums are established: 
 'Nevertheless, the Department would like to review the requirement that trade unions must trigger the 
establishment of such forums. We are seeking the increased utilization of these forums, as we believe they can 
constitute meaningful avenues of engagement between employers and employees on issues such as 
restructuring and affirmative action.' 9 
It is unclear at present what the nature of the contemplated amendment will be. At least 
two possibilities present themselves: allowing employers also to apply for the establishment 
of workplace forums, or placing employers under a duty to establish workplace forums (as 
in Europe). Draft legislation is expected in the latter part of 2000 and may be enacted in 
2001. 
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(b) Germany 
The Works Constitution Act (WCA) does not provide German trade unions with the same 
sweeping powers over works councils that are found in the LRA. As in South Africa, 
provision is made for the involvement of trade unions in various aspects of the operation of 
works councils. But, unlike in South Africa, the statutory provisions are directed at 
safeguarding the integrity of works council proceedings as much as protecting trade unions 
against encroachment by works councils upon their territory. 10 
Works councils appoint their own electoral boards to organize elections. Trade unions with 
members in the workplace are entitled to be represented on such boards. If none of their 
members have been appointed to the board, s 16(1) provides that 'each trade union 
represented in the establishment may . . . delegate a representative belonging to the 
establishment to the electoral board as a non-voting member'. If a works council fails to 
appoint an electoral board, a trade union represented in the workplace may apply to the 
Labour Court for its appointment (s 16(2)). 
Trade unions are also entitled to challenge the outcome of works council elections in the 
Labour Court on procedural grounds (s 19), apply for the removal of any member of a 
works council on grounds of grave dereliction of statutory duties (s 23(1)) or interdict an 
employer from gross violation of its duties under the Act (s 23(3)). 
Delegates from the trade unions represented in the establishment are entitled to attend all 
'works and department meetings' in an advisory capacity (s 46(1)). Trade unions are not 
entitled to attend meetings of the works council as of right but only upon invitation by 
'one-fourth of the members or the majority of a group represented on the works council' (s 
31). In this event the trade union delegate is entitled to receive the agenda of the meeting 
and a copy of 'the section of the minutes which concerns him' (s 34(2)). A trade union may, 
however, require a works council to call a works meeting if no such meeting has been held 
during the preceding 'calendar half year' (s 43(4)). 
The primacy of collective bargaining is safeguarded in two ways. Firstly, the WCA stipulates 
that '[t]he employer and the works council shall work together in a spirit of mutual trust 
having regard to the applicable collective agreements and in co-operation with the trade 
unions and employers' associations represented in the establishment for the good of the 
employees and of the establishment' (s 2(1)). It is further provided that the WCA '[s]hall 
not affect the functions of trade unions and employers associations and more particularly 
the 
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protection of their members' interests' (s 2(3)). This provides a Sframework for the 
interpretation of the parties' statutory rights and duties which is absent from the LRA. 11 
Secondly, s 77(3) provides that 'works agreements shall not deal with remuneration and 
other conditions of employment that have been fixed or are normally fixed by collective 
agreement'. 12   The words 'or are normally fixed by collective agreement' are important 
because they address a lacuna which has been noted in the LRA: they exclude the 
jurisdiction of works councils not only over matters actually dealt with in a collective 
agreement but also in the event that (i) agreement is not reached or (ii) bargaining has not 
taken place but the topic in question is 'normally' bargained over. Mere refusal to bargain by 
the employer or deadlock thus cannot suffice, as in South Africa, to give the works council 
jurisdiction over an issue that had previously formed part of the bargaining agenda. 
Windbichler notes some of the competing considerations which enter into the rationale: 
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 'The basic rule in German law is that the collective agreement between union and employers always prevails. 
This was introduced to avoid competition between the union and the works council. The topics of bargaining are 
rather strictly regulated for the works council, and the protection of the individual is much more elaborate. This 
has to be so because its a mandatory structure. [On the other hand t]he works council has a much broader 
basis of legitimation because everybody is entitled to vote in the works council election.' 13 
Section 77(3) goes on to state, however, that a collective agreement may expressly 
authorize 'the making of supplementary works agreements'. 
(c) The Netherlands 
The starting-point of the Works Councils Act (WCA) is a delineation of the powers of the 
works council. It is required to focus on the interests of the workplace as a whole and the 
persons employed in the workplace. It is the task of the trade unions to engage in collective 
bargaining negotiations about primary terms and conditions of employment and to protect 
individual interests. In practice, however, 
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there is scope for overlaps which may be a source of tension between trade unions and 
works councils. 
As in Germany, a trade union with members in the workplace may submit a list of 
candidates for election to the works council (s 9(2)). Trade unions may also request the 
employer to set up a joint works council in enterprises with more than one workplace (s 
3(2)), request that a separate works council be set up for part of an enterprise if it is 
considered that this will advance the proper application of the WCA (s 4(2)) and express 
their views about applications by employers to be exempted from establishing a works 
council for a specified period (s 5(2)). 
Similarly, trade unions do not have an automatic right to attend works council meetings but 
may do so by invitation (s 16(1)). 14 
The primacy of collective bargaining is safeguarded by providing that the rights to 
consultation and joint decision making given to the works council will lapse as soon as a 
matter is regulated in a collective bargaining agreement. 15   Powers in addition to the 
statutory powers may be given to works councils by collective agreement (s 32(1)) but such 
additional powers will not apply 'insofar as the substance of the matter has already been 
regulated for the enterprise by a collective labour agreement or in a ruling laid down by a 
public body' (s 32(3)). 
(d) Belgium 
Works councils in Belgium exist alongside of two other bodies for the representation of 
employee interests: the trade union delegation and the Committee for Prevention (of 
accidents) and Protection at Work (CPPW). 
Works councils are bipartite statutory bodies including representatives of employees and 
management. 16   Works council elections take place every four years. 17   To be elected, 
employees must feature on the list of candidates presented by the most representative 
unions except in the case of 'cadres' (leading personnel), whose candidates may also be 
nominated by  - 
• the representative union of 'cadres', or 
• 10% of the 'cadres' in the enterprise, thus allowing for independent candidates. 
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Works councils and CPPWs are incapable of making company level collective agreements. 
Union delegations are the bodies most involved 
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with collective bargaining at enterprise level, provided they have been given delegated 
authority by one of the three representative unions to do so. 18   A union delegation can 
only be established at the request of one or more representative trade unions 19   and, if so 
requested, the employer is obliged to comply. If there are elections the unions will draw up 
the list of candidates. There is no room for independent candidates. 20 
In addition, union delegations enjoy certain rights within the company which in other 
jurisdictions are typically extended to works councils. These include  - 
• the supervision of the application of labour standards, labour laws, collective agreements 
and work rules; 
• right to advance information on matters which could affect working conditions or 
remuneration methods; 
• joint decision-making rights concerning measures to deal with an increased workload, 
such as overtime and the use of temporary workers from an agency; 
• in the absence of a CPPW, carrying out the duties normally assigned to such committee. 
21 
If there is no works council in the company, the union delegation also has the right to 
receive the annual social balance sheet. 22 
 
 
3 the Debate 
The relationship between trade unions and collective bargaining on the one hand and 
workplace forums and the participatory process on the other has, predictably, been one of 
the more controversial aspects of the LRA. Critics of the statutory model have broadly 
formed themselves into two schools of thought: those who believe that the LRA does not go 
far enough in differentiating workplace forums from trade unions, and those who believe 
that it goes too far. Representatives of the first school tend to come from the ranks of 
scholarly researchers and consultants while the second point of view has its strongest 
resonance among trade unionists. 
(a) The LRA does not go far enough 
The essential point is that the array of legal powers given to trade 
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unions over workplace forums and their agendas constrain workplace forums to act as 
extensions of trade unions and their agendas rather than as genuine participatory 
structures. The LRA, in other words, accommodates trade union concerns at the expense of 
promoting genuine worker participation. It 'does not take sufficient cognisance of the 
essential precondition of worker participation: creating institutions unequivocally dedicated 
to facilitating co-operative decision-making by employers and employees'. 23 
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When the debate about the introduction of workplace forums was at its height Baskin 
commented as follows: 
 'Many unionists (and most companies) see the forums as a threat. But this argument is, at least superficially, 
hard to sustain. A range of union safeguards have been built into the chapter on workplace forums. Employers 
cannot set up a forum, only a majority union can trigger one; and disestablishment is also provided for. Union 
officials are entitled to attend forum meetings and provide advice. Unions have preferential rights in nominating 
candidates for election. The agenda for forum-management interaction excludes items which are collectively 
bargained by the union. And so on. . . . If anything, the LRA can be accused of being contradictory in design. It 
wants to encourage workplace co-operation whilst retaining extensive mechanisms that may simply perpetuate 
shopfloor adversarialism.' 24 
A similar prediction was made by Brassey and Brand in somewhat blunter terms: 
 'Though it has some of the trappings of corporatism, the workplace forum will in practice be no more than a 
sophisticated and more powerful version of the shopstewards' committee. As the majority union uses it to fight 
battles that they have lost elsewhere, it will become yet another bargaining forum whose proceedings are 
characterized by aggressive distributive bargaining across an adversarial divide in the plant itself.' 25 
There is support internationally for the view that too close an overlap between trade unions 
and participatory structures undermines the effectiveness of the latter as vehicles of joint 
problem solving. The European model of statutory worker participation was premised, by 
and large, on the notion of a clear separation between collective bargaining at sectoral level 
and works councils operating at plant level. Although the LRA set out to promote centralized 
bargaining in order to create a similar separation, collective bargaining continues in many 
instances to take place at plant level. This structural problem may be compounded by the 
LRA's encouragement of trade union control over works councils and result in blurring the 
distinction between the two processes: 
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 'The same people who negotiate the collective agreement must then deal with the problems of plant safety, 
changes in production processes, product quality and productivity. Adversarial attitudes of the bargaining table 
carry over to daily plant relations. Problems are not solved but fought over.' 26 
(b) The LRA goes too far 
The argument that the LRA gives workplace forums too much independence from trade 
unions has been put most forcefully by Von Holdt. Because of the adversarial nature of 
industrial relations in South Africa, it is assumed, there is no prospect of two institutions 
charged with the representation of employee interests operating at workplace level in the 
manner contemplated by the LRA; conflict between them is inevitable. The only viable type 
of workplace forum, in Von Holdt's opinion, is that referred to in the LRA as a 'trade union 
based workplace forum' 27   - in effect, shop stewards' committees invested with the rights 
of participation set out in chapter V and doubling as workplace forums. 
This would, of course, represent the most extreme form of overlap between adversarial and 
non-adversarial process from the point of view described in section (a) above and would 
rule out any possibility of workplace forums serving as organs of 'shopfloor co-operation'. 
Specifically, Von Holdt saw the following problems arising if workplace forums were formally 
independent of union structures: 
 1 Workplace forums could weaken unions because workers may no longer see the 
need to join unions as they already are represented in the workplace forum. 
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 2 'Demarcation conflicts' may arise which will result in issues being shifted back and 
forth between forums, promoting factionalism and divisions within unions between 
shop stewards in workplace forums and collective bargaining; 
 3 Trade unions 'negotiating strength may be diluted in the forum by the presence of 
representatives of lower management and other non-members'. 28 
 4 It is 'generally true that stronger forums tend to drive out weaker forums. The 
workplace forums should be stronger because they have more resources, and so 
marginalize the weaker collective bargaining forums'. 29 
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Baskin, having noted that the LRA seeks to avert these very problems by giving trade 
unions unprecedented legal powers over workplace forums, went on to argue that the real 
difficulty might be something rather different. Having triggered workplace forums, he 
suggested, unions could find themselves faced with a Frankenstein monster: 
 '[W]orkplace forums may indeed be a threat to unions - not through the forums themselves but because unions 
may lack the capacity to give meaningful support to union members sitting there. Forums will not deal with 
familiar issues, like wages, but with productivity, technology, investment and so on. Without the capacity to 
provide expert advice to forum members, unions may alienate themselves and prove irrelevant.' 31 
Put simply, an ineffectual trade union presence at plant level may create a vacuum that 
workplace forums could fill, either by force of circumstances or with a little help from 
employers. The fear is that workers may transfer their loyalties from an inadequate trade 
union to a workplace forum that is better able to represent their interests and thus turn 
curable union weakness into terminal decline. 
(c) Germany and the Netherlands 
Both arguments outlined above proceed from extreme and generalized assumptions - on the 
one hand, that workplace forums will be completely dominated by a powerful trade union 
presence; on the other hand, that trade unions are too weak to exert influence over 
workplace forums. The real situation is considerably more complex and, while both 
stereotypes are no doubt to be found in particular workplaces, it is clear - as reflected by 
the fieldwork discussed below - that there are numerous situations where the assumptions 
on which chapter V of the LRA are based may be borne out to a greater or lesser extent. 
European precedents of relations between trade unions and works councils help to place the 
question in perspective. While there are manifest socioeconomic contrasts between South 
Africa and Europe, the experiences of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium encapsulate 
responses to practical problems developed over many decades and offer insight into modes 
of coexistence between trade unions and participatory structures. 
At least two trends can be distinguished - first, the potential for a division of labour between 
trade unions and works councils and, second, the scope for conflict or a blurring of roles 
within that division. 
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(i) A division of labour . . . 
A central feature of the German industrial relations system is the separation between 
collective bargaining by trade unions and participation (consultation and joint decision 
making) by works councils. Weiss explains: 
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 'In Germany, economic terms are bargained at the industrial or sectoral level. Bargaining may be bitter and end 
in strikes, but neither plant managers nor plant representatives - the works council - are involved in the 
confrontational bargaining. The adversarial bargaining of the collective agreement leaves little or no residue of 
hostility to undermine cooperation 32   at the plant level. The same is true in Sweden. Collective agreements 
establishing economic terms are centrally negotiated. Workplace problems are resolved by local management 
and local union officers. The antagonisms generated by bargaining do not carry over to the day-to-day 
discussion of workplace issues.' 33 
These outcomes may appear to suggest that 'cooperation' is primarily issue driven - 
'antagonism' in the workplace can be avoided by a relatively simple exercise of separating 
'adversarial' issues from 'non-adversarial' ones and placing the latter on the agenda of 
participatory structures. 34   This instrumentalist assumption was manifest in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Labour Relations Act 35   and clearly informed the 
definition of the powers and role of workplace forums contained in chapter V. 
Arguably, this view confuses cause and effect. The division between 'distributive' and 
'productivity' issues, in Germany as elsewhere, has been the outcome of a complex, ongoing 
process of interaction between employers and employees rather than something 
predetermined by the nature of the issues themselves. Historically, the identification of 
'productivity' issues developed as an extension of the collective 
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bargaining process and, more specifically, in response to the proliferation of local 
operational issues which a centralized collective bargaining system is ill-suited to address. A 
classic example was the collective agreement signed in the German metal industry in 1984 
which provided for average weekly working time of 38,5 hours. In determining actual 
working hours at plant level the circumstances of the individual establishments had to be 
taken into account. To achieve this the unions, given their lack of plant level structures, 
were left with no choice but to integrate the works councils in the barganing system. As a 
result, working hours ranging from 37 to 40 hours were agreed between works councils and 
employers in different enterprises. 36 
Trade union attitudes toward works councils have tended to be ambiguous. Codetermination 
in the enterprise has been regarded as valuable, implying that employees' opinions will be 
taken seriously. It can contribute towards socially acceptable behaviour by companies. 37   
At the same time trade unions have viewed works councils as (potential) competitors. Trade 
unions generally insist that they possess primacy in negotiations about conditions of 
employment and that the works council plays a supplementary role. The trade unions argue 
that the works councils have insufficient countervailing power because they do not possess 
the strike weapon and because they are dependent on the employer. 38 
The tendency towards decentralization in the realization of conditions of employment 
however, has made it necessary for trade unions to review their suspicious attitude. Rood 
describes the process: 
 'Our collective contract system is for a large part industry based. Gradually we have come to the conclusion 
that the working hours in enterprise X in the metal industry do not necessarily have to be the same as those in 
enterprise Y also in the metal industry. On top of that we live in an age of decentralisation - ie bringing such 
decision-taking as close as possible to the shopfloor. It is now possible to conclude a collective agreement per 
enterprise. So it is feasible via this route. But our system is in the first place more industry-orientated. While 
the works council orientates itself more towards the enterprise itself. The Works Council Act sees the enterprise 
as an organisational unit of labour. In other words in a given place people work on the basis of a collective 
agreement, an organisational structure, as well as a manager are present. In such an enterprise we install a 
works council.' 39 
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As in Germany, the regulation of working hours illustrates the manner in which a division of 
labour between trade unions and works councils has been established: 
 'If for example you lay down by collective agreement that in a certain sector work starts at eight and ends at 
five o'clock, then the works council has no say in the matter, because it has already been worked out in a 
substantive way in the 
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collective agreement. But you can also say in the collective agreement: working hours shall be 36 hours per week. 
Then it will be necessary to determine with the consent of the works council when work will start and when it 
will end.' 40 
During the parliamentary debate about the most recent change of the Works Councils Act in 
1997 the views of the trade unions towards works councils was discussed at length. The 
representatives of the FNV and the CNV 41   were of the opinion that the works council is 
not 'a type of union' which can make binding decisions for its employees. The works council 
is not a union of employees that looks after their interests. However, a collective agreement 
can delegate authority to the works council. The trade unions state that not the works 
councils but the trade union federations play a directive role in the negotiation about 
conditions of employment. Although the trade unions are of the opinion that decentralization 
must be encouraged, they feel that it cannot and should not be the case that employers can 
'freely shop around'. The works council should continue to play a supplementary role. 42 
Coexistence and a division of labour between trade unions and works councils are the 
practical result. Slomp explains: 
 'I really only see room for worker participation if the trade union movement is also quite strong at industry or 
regional level, and negotiated there: if there can be separation between topics of participation, which can 
remain in the workplace, and the major conditions of employment - such as wages, working hours - which are 
negotiated by the union outside the workplace. . . .' 43 
The Director of the Dutch Centre for Works Councils confirms: 
 'I see a tendency towards increasing mutual dependency. Also within the unions. The Dutch trade unions for a 
long time saw the works council as an organ of the enterprise which you should not waste too much energy on 
- which you might even have to oppose because they are used to keep the unions out. The last few years the 
unions have seen that their active members are elected in massive numbers, and that is often after all a very 
good way to manage the interests of the employees.' 44 
(ii) . . . or a blurring of roles? 
At the same time, the emerging division of labour signifies 'a gradual weakening of the 
former, relatively strict separation of plant and enterprise level on the one hand and 
collective bargaining on the other. It also implies that works council and unions are 
increasingly becoming competitors. The power relationship between the two will have to be 
reformulated'. 45 
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In the Netherlands it was proposed in the early 1990's that terms and conditions of 
employment should be placed on the works council agenda in workplaces not covered by 
collective agreement. 46   The FNV called for a duty of joint decision making in respect of 
an employer's proposals to determine, amend or cancel terms of employment not subject to 
a collective agreement. The alternative, it believed, was to allow the employer to do so 
unilaterally. 47 
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The notion of involving works councils (or workplace forums) in wage bargaining, even 
under controlled conditions, signifies a radical departure from the traditional model and 
presents trade unions with a complex new agenda of opportunities as well as threats: 
 'The starting point is still that terms of employment are primarily the concern of the union and that works 
councils should be excluded as far as possible. But I think there is more awareness now that the expertise to 
negotiate terms of employment is very specific and that works councils, even with authorisation to do so, will in 
any event have to approach the unions for assistance. And if the works' councils get such authorisation in 
sectors where the unions have no presence, it will open up possibilities for unions to become involved in 
collective bargaining. 48   But if you give more powers to works councils, all sorts of problems arise which are 
not yet provided for in the law. The works council is deemed to act in the interests of the enterprise as a whole, 
not representing employees' interests only but taking everything into account. And if the works councils get 
greater powers to negotiate . . . there is the problem of industry-level agreements. . . . If negotiations take 
place with works cuncils at plant level, the promotion of union policy in respect of job creation and so on 
becomes more difficult to handle.' 49 
Yet conflict between works councils and trade unions is by no means unavoidable. The 
collective bargaining system, supplemented by workplace level fine-tuning between 
employers and works councils, functions well and there is no great pressure to change it. 
Nor does alienation between trade union members in the workplace and their unions appear 
to be a major factor. While there is undoubtedly scope for conflict over the dividing line 
between the responsibilities of trade unions and works councils, in practice the problem may 
well be self-limiting: 
 'I sometimes think that trade union fractions in works councils . . . don't attach a great deal of importance to 
expanding the powers of works councils. And that the demand [for expanded powers] is especially strong on 
works councils without 
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trade union fractions or where the unions are very weak. I think the idea is also popular among academics. . . . To 
get it in perspective, terms of employment are determined by collective agreement, directly or indirectly, for 
about 80 per cent of employees in the Netherlands. Twenty per cent have terms of employment where 
collective bargaining played no role. So the amendment of the law [to permit works councils to negotiate over 
wages in workplaces not covered by collective agreement] would affect that 20 per cent in particular. And those 
are often small enterprises, plus enterprises which very deliberately want to keep the union out.' 50 
(d) Belgium 
The crucial difference between Belgium on the one hand and the Netherlands and Germany 
on the other is that Belgian trade unions are well represented at company level both in legal 
and practical terms. Union delegations are active in most enterprises and the most 
representative unions have an exclusive right to nominate candidates for works council 
elections (with the exception of the special rules that apply to leading personnel or 'cadres'). 
In this manner unions have extended their reach to individual companies, effectively 
monitoring the observance of labour laws and collective agreements through the union 
delegation and staying well informed about current developments in production, technology 
and organization through the works council. Company based union delegates function as an 
interface between the trade union leadership and the rank and file. As such works councils 
can be seen as a workplace based mechanism favouring trade unions. The practical division 
of labour closely follows the legal positin and the debate about a division of roles between 
works councils and trade unions does not present itself in the same way as in the 
Netherlands, Germany or South Africa. 51 
(e) A possible synthesis 
Participatory structures are increasingly a given. The question for trade unions in South 
Africa, as elsewhere, is no longer whether or not to support their creation but how to relate 
to them. Adu-Amankwah and Kester argue that '[t]he need for the trade unions to consider 
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this [worker participation] policy option derives from the understanding that collective 
bargaining covers only the contractual aspects of employment. . . . Collective bargaining 
negotiations are often based on the effects of [operational] decisions and not on the 
decisions themselves'. 52   Participation is about operational decisions. If trade unions are 
not prepared to take the initiative in establishing structures for this purpose, management 
will do so. 53   The authors conclude: 
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 '[T]he imperative for the trade union to meet this challenge is that together with collective bargaining, it 
increases worker influence to many areas of importance to them. It expresses a recognition of the need for 
supplementary strategy and not just a call for choice between collective bargaining and worker participation.' 
54 
This is not to deny the difficulties that may be experienced in a country such as South Africa 
in making the transition from a purely adversarial relationship to a more complex 
relationship of collective bargaining combined with joint problem solving and decision 
making. As Deale observes: 
 'Clearly, the range of [participatory] issues intrudes deeply into the traditional realms of management 
prerogative. Union officials and workers may feel equally daunted by the prospect of having to switch from 
confrontational mode to creative engagement on sometimes unfamiliar issues. This will naturally cause some 
discomfort to both managers and workers and a period of orientation may be necessary to assist with the 
adjustment.' 55 
In practice, nevertheless, the fortunes of collective bargaining and employee participation, 
of trade unions and participatory structures, are inextricably linked. 56   While conditions 
vary considerably from workplace to workplace, industry to industry and country to country, 
there are certain issues, at any given point in time, which employers and employees find 
appropriate to regulate by means of the collective bargaining machinery at their disposal 
and others which they find more appropriate to regulate by means of participatory 
structures. The distinction drawn between bargaining matters and participatory matters is 
explained ex post facto with reference to the nature of the issues, 57   the forums at which 
they are tabled 58   or the 
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manner in which they are dealt with. 59   In reality, it is submitted, it cannot finally be 
reduced to any one of these determinants. The borderlines between collective bargaining 
and worker participation are demarcated through practical interaction - the limits to which 
one proces is taken determine where the other one begins. 
Also in South Africa 'mutual dependency' between collective bargaining and worker 
participation may become increasingly manifest. Ironically, the catalyst in the process may 
be the adversarial nature of collective bargaining itself. Worker participation appears to 
function most effectively where both parties respect each others strength. The relationship 
often starts by being adversarial, with each party flexing its muscles. Through trial and error 
the parties learn that participation in structures that are based on cooperation offers a less 
costly and more satisfactory means of dealing with many problems. 60 
The power dimension may also be influential in determining the level at which participation 
takes place. Bendix's observation in respect of collective bargaining is helpful also in 
understanding the process by which participatory structures may be shaped: 
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 'The level of collective bargaining - at enterprise, industry or region - evolves, therefore, from the trade union's 
structure and cannot be determined by any other factor but the dynamics contained in the process of free 
association of workers for the pursuit of their interests. Collective bargaining will thus take place at the level at 
which a trade union has built its power base.' 61 
 
 
4 the Practical Position 
(a) South Africa 
(i)The composition of participatory structures 
As in Europe, workplace forums and participatory structures consist predominantly of trade 
union members or representatives. There is, however, a significant departure from the 
Dutch or German norm. In these countries works council members are freely elected but 
trade union nominees capture a majority of seats. In most of the South African workplaces 
covered by the fieldwork, a greater or lesser number of seats were formally reserved for 
trade union representatives. This may reflect the legacy of adversarialism between trade 
unions and employers, with neither side prepared to resign itself to 
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the outcome of elections but preferring the certainty of an outcome determined in advance. 
62 
A breakdown of the membership of workplace forums and non-statutory structures at 
unionized workplaces reveals the following: 
WORKPLACE FORUMS 
COMPANY TOTAL NUMBER OF UNION 
REPRESENTATIVES 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
REPRESENSTATIVES 
CONSTITUTION or 
ELECTION 
 NAME NUMBER   
A NEHAWU 
Unorganized labour 
2 
1 
3 but constitution 
makes provision for 5 
None of the seats are 
reserved for union 
members 
B Staff Association 
Mineworkers Union 
CWIU 
HTP Works Council 
Non-organized labour 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
14 (at present there 
are only 12 seats) 
12 seats reserved for 
union members 
C NUTESA 
NEHAWU 
1 
1 
1 
16 other stakeholders 
18 
2 seats reserved for 
trade union members 
D CAWU 
SAWU 
4 
1 
10 
5 management 
 
E NUTESA 
NEHAWU 
8 
8 
24 
12 management 
representatives 
 
 
 
NON-STATUTORY STRUCTURES 
COMPANY UNIONS TOTAL NUMBER OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
CONSTITUTION or 
ELECTION 
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NAME NUMBER   
F   28 Only 1 seat is 
reserved for organized 
labour 
G NUMSA 
MOCLAWU 
1 
2 
9 
1 packer 
1 mixer 
2 operators 
2 representatives 
NUMSA shop steward 
appointed; other 2 
union members 
elected 
H   10 None of the seats are 
reserved for union 
members 
I NUMSA 3 6 
3 management 
 
J NUMSA 
NETU 
SEAWUSA 
3 
2 
1 
11: 
3 management 
2 office staff 
6 seats reserved for 
union members 
K FAWU 6 12 
6 management 
All 6 worker 
representatives are 
senior shop stewards 
L SATU 5  All 5 seats are 
reserved for union 
members 
M SATU 
Non-unionized 
2 
1 
6 
3 management 
 
N SACCAWU 6 12 
6 management 
representatives 
 
O CWIU 
SACWU 
Employers Association 
4 
4 
4 
+/- 24 
4 senior managers 
4 supervisors 
1 staff 
1 technology 
1 middle management 
1 engineering 
 
 
 
(ii)The problem of policy 
The response by the trade union federations to worker participation, in general, has been to 
avoid the issue and allow affiliates to make their own decisions as to whether to participate 
or not. FEDUSA indicated that it does not have a policy on participation and was not 
planning to formulate one in the near future. 63 
The lack of policy is problematical in that, if collective positions are absent, self-interest will 
prevail. Collective planning on how to address strategically important issues like 
retrenchment or restructuring, which are often dealt with in participatory structures, is 
inhibited. 64   A further consequence is that the establishment of participatory structures 
tends to take place as a result of management initiatives or under management control, 
with trade unions passively accepting the Soutcome rather than helping to shape it. 65 
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These trends were confirmed by the fieldwork. At Company P the union indicated that it had 
no policy on workplace forums but 'if members wanted such a structure [the union] would 
be constitutionally bound to yield to such demands and a policy would have to be evolved at 
national level'. NUMSA was thought to have a policy but no copies were available. At 
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Company Q it was believed that the union would not be opposed to the establishment of a 
workplace forum provided that it was 'union based and driven by shop stewards'. At 
Company R and Company O the view was that the union would not trigger a workplace 
forum but would 'not stand in the way of another union doing so'. The initiative, in general, 
was left to others. 
There are a number of possible explanations for trade unions' reluctance to engage with the 
challenges of worker participation, even to the limited extent of developing a policy on 
paper. These include: 
• trade unions do not have confidence in participation in view of past experience; 66 
• unions already have their hands full with collective bargaining; 
• unions may be reluctant to engage with structures which are usually seen as dealing 
with issues like restructuring that involve job losses. Understandably, they may prefer to 
steer clear of processes leading to decisions which are seen as detrimental to the workers; 
67   and 
• unions may see participation at enterprise level as resulting in the diffusion of their 
powers. 
The last mentioned concern is probably related to capacity problems within unions and the 
haemorrhage of leadership into governmental structures (for example, the CCMA and the 
Department of Labour). The outcome in many cases is pockets of powerful shop stewards 
operating under the umbrella of a ever-weakening union structure. These shop stewards are 
not looking at overall strategic responses to issues but are rather concerned what is 
happening at their individual workplaces. 68   Participatory structures, even if they consist 
of shop stewards, may in practice be autonomous of union control. 
This was graphically illustrated at Company P, where amicable relations appeared to exist 
between the union and the company but tensions were manifest between shop stewards 
and the union - for example, alleged failure by shop stewards to attend meetings and 
attempts to undermine the union by refusing to pay dues. 
Since it is difficult for unions to express lack of confidence in their local leadership, the 
lesser of two evils may be to abstain from any 
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form of involvement with participatory structures or, where engagement cannot be avoided, 
to hold employers responsible for any divisions that may open up within union ranks. The 
reluctance to develop policy would be explicable in this context, since any policy would in 
effect amount to conditional endorsement of a second channel. Denial is the safer course of 
action. 
(iii)Negative union attitudes towards participation 
Generally, trade unionists seemed sceptical about the reasons for participation. At 
Companies O, R and Q they believed it was part of management's 'overall strategy to limit 
interruptions to production'. At Company F the union was aware of the limits to the 
influence it could exert and had begun to resist 'cooption'. At another company shop 
stewards had a range of negative perceptions of management conduct. Inter alia: 
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 'They say ''yes, we will do this' but at the end of the day when they were supposed to take action we would find 
that they were not abiding by decisions.' 69 
 'Management made things difficult by saying that we need certain training. . . . They said we should concern 
ourselves with issues and decisions related to our specific jobs on the shop floor and end there. In other words, 
they were shifting the emphasis away from decision-making at a management level to the specific jobs that 
workers were doing. . . . This ''training' and discussion process conducted by ITISA started appearing as a 
strategy to co-opt us.' 70 
It is striking that these views consist of value judgments made over issues where 
management may safely be expected to arrive at opposite value judgments. They reflect, in 
other words, an underlying conflict of perceptions and a predisposition to disagree rather 
than actual deadlock over material issues where consensus was sought but could be found. 
Whether based on substance or perception, however, adversarial attitudes exert a very real 
influence on events. Negative perceptions appear to be the single greatest reasons why 
applications for the establishment of workplace forums are so frequently aborted after being 
lodged. In fully 50% of cases the reason for non-establishment was subsequent opposition 
from the ranks of the union that had applied for establishment. 71 
One exception to the rule of trade union scepticism appeared to be the Workplace Challenge 
Project. It may be that the 'pilot site' approach appears non-threatening because it is seen 
as a short-term programme - the unions participation can be terminated at any time. 72 
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(iv)Advantages for unions 
Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced by unions in engaging with participatory 
structures in general and workplace forums in particular, there are practical benefits also. 
Baskin notes: 
 '[Workplace] forums encourage substantial employee involvement and workplace democratisation; an extensive 
list of consultation items are included. And while the joint-determination agenda is fairly limited the potential 
exists for unions to extend these rights. Forums will also provide unions with opportunities to recruit members, 
especially from the ranks of the more skilled and white-collar employees. And they could encourage inter-union 
cooperation at the workplace even while rivalry continues at sectoral level.' 73 
In addition, trade unions might in certain situations be persuaded that improvements in 
productivity or efficiency could increase take home pay more than industrial action. 74 
(v)Shop stewards' views 
Very little evidence emerged as to the relationship between trade unions and workplace 
forums. At Company A a shop steward said the union 'was satisfied with the workplace 
forum structure. There was no confusion [as to] the roles of the workplace forum and the 
union'. 75   This rather bland statement, however, can hardly be taken as conclusive. In 
reality there is likely to be a diverse range of relationships varying widely from workplace to 
workplace. 
A clearer picture emerges from case studies of non-statutory structures. In one workplace 
(Company I) participation was perceived as producing the following advantages for unions: 
•    additional information; 
•    better communication in the factory; 
•    winning new members every day; 
•    being closer to the point where decisions are made. 
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At Company P, where the system of participation is uninstitutionalized, shop stewards were 
pleased with 'the degree of openness, flexibility and responsiveness that existed'. They 
realized, however, that the system was extremely vulnerable and would have difficulties if 
confronted with 'tougher' issues. A good working relationship existed between the company 
and the union, which admitted that due to its 'interdependence with management' it was 
'committed to cooperation in the expansion of the business'. 
In companies such as Company S and Company Q sophisticated participatory systems seek 
to ensure that issues are dealt with at the 
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most efficient level by the most appropriate structure. At Company Q, the negotiating 
committee is the core of the system and decides where matters should be referred to. The 
basic question is: 'What belongs where?' If a matter cannot be resolved at the consultation 
business unit, it must be resolved through the appropriate dispute resolution procedure. 
This seems to ensure that 'parties enjoy the flexibility [that it offers] but at the same time 
there is a certain amount of certainty' about which structures will have the competency to 
deal with which issues. At Company P, similar thinking underpinned the functioning of the 
participatory structure. 76 
(b) Germany 
The Works Constitution Act extends certain rights to unions with members at the enterprise. 
77   First, all unions have initiating functions. The formation of a works council is mandatory 
but not in the sense that there is any state mechanism for enforcement if the employer fails 
to call an election. 'So the enforcement mechanism is that the unions have the right to call 
for an election, provided that there is at least one member of the union employed there.' 78   
The union may also initiate a works meeting where the workers are to decide whether they 
want a works council or not. But, as Weiss points out, 'these initiating functions in practice 
only play a very marginal role, otherwise the widespread non-existence of works councils or 
the non-conductance of works meetings would not be possible'. 79 
Secondly, trade unions have 'controlling' functions. The trade unions have extended rights 
of control over the election procedure and may even apply to court for the nullification of an 
election if legal rules were not properly applied. If a member of the works council, or the 
council as such, has neglected the duties of the office the union may apply to court to have 
the member removed from office or the works council dissolved. If the employer does not 
abide by the duties as defined by the Works Constitution Act, the union is entitled to initiate 
the enforcement of sanctions by the Labour Courts. 80 
However, to obtain a truer reflection of the unions' influence on works councils' policy one 
has to go beyond the formal structure of the works council system. In some sectors, 
especially in larger corporations, the unions have their so-called trusted representatives 
(vertreuensleute) inside the plant, who in some cases are appointed by the union and in 
other cases are elected by union members. Weiss 
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comments: 'These union representatives are seen as the communication link between union 
members and union administration. In addition, they support, influence, and sometimes 
even to a certain extent control, works council activities.' 81 
The large involvement of the DGB in works councils has led to close cooperation between 
unions and works councils. This is expressed inter alia in the way that collective agreements 
Copyright JUTA & Co (Pty) Ltd 
 
 
are framed. Collective agreements often apply to a region or sector, while the detail is 
worked out at enterprise level through agreements between the employer and the works 
council. In this way the trade union and works council complement each other - the trade 
union provides central outlines and the works councils fill in the details per Senterprise. 82 
The WCA says that works council members have the right to participate in training activities 
at the expense of the employer. 'In practice', according to Weiss, 'you'll find almost hundred 
percent are offered by the trade unions. Trade union in this country, because they are big 
and rich, have facilities. They have teaching facilities and they have specialised teaching 
personnel'. 83   In addition, members of the trade union which are also works council 
members usually receive free training 'on all legal matters and all areas that you have to 
cover as a works council member'. 84 
The deputy president of a works council at a large corporation confirms: 
 'We frequently invite representatives of IG Chemie to join us in our meetings, depending on the subject. . . . 
We may decide for instance this case of negotiation with management on flexitime agreement is highly 
sophisticated, so we want some outside advice, and we ask IG Chemie to support us in that negotiation.' 85 
A specific instance arose when the works council had to negotiate with the company about 
the possible retrenchment of 225 workers: 
 'Trade unions have a wide range of experience with the reduction of the work force in many German 
companies, which they can bring into our negotiations with management. If we had only our [own] experience 
available in this particular case, we would certainly not have been in the position to optimally pursue individual 
employees' interests.' 86 
German unions appear to have overcome the institutional problem of dual representation by 
having a large proportion of union members 
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who are also works council members. 87   The representation of unions affiliated to the 
DGB 88   in the works councils is on average about 80%, giving it a predominant voice in 
many works councils. 89   Other trade unions account for a further 4%. Conversely, many 
works councils are almost helpless without union support; and many works council 
members perform functions in trade unions. 90 
Trade unions are, however, only entitled to help their members or works councils on which 
their members serve. 91   According to law, works councils can ask for the presence of 
trade union officials at meetings. '[A]nd then', Weiss observes, 'the works council gets lots 
of input on what the policy of a decent works council, from the perspective of the trade 
union, should be. This is very, very Simportant.' 92 
Against this background, can it still be said that participation by works councils remains 
distinct from collective bargaining as in the textbook definition? Weiss responded to this 
question as follows: 
 'If you talk to 95% of my colleagues in Germany, they would say that [participation] has nothing to do with 
bargaining because the statute, well, labels it differently. I would say that that's rubbish. Of course it's 
bargaining, but its bargaining with a different structure. Because bargaining in the context of collective 
bargaining in the strict sense in this country means bargaining with the threat of industrial action. Whereas 
here industrial action is out, so you only bargain with the threat of the arbitration committee. If you bargain in 
the area of economic matters, you do not have the right to co-determination. You bargain without threat. You 
bargain on the basis of goodwill. And of course this is a totally different type of bargaining, but it is still 
bargaining.' 93 
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Given the degree of overlap between the functions of trade unions and works councils, does 
conflict arise in practice over the demarcation of their respective domains? Experience 
suggests that, where necessary, trade unions will jealously guard their primacy in the area 
of collective bargaining. In a number of cases trade unions have gone to court. 94   In one 
case the court pronounced that extra allowances which the employer had granted to 
employees were a hidden increase of the wage as determined in the collective agreement. 
The judge declared this allowance null and void on the basis that the collective agreement 
takes precedence. But in another case it was ruled that, 
2000 ILJ p1570 
although wages were fixed by the collective agreement, this did not make it impossible for 
the works council in special instances to agree on allowances with management. The 
prohibition does not extend so far, the court found, that a collective agreement about wages 
makes an allowance provision impossible. 95 
Other differences between trade unions and works councils may arise over matters of 
policy. The classic example of a division of labour between unions and works councils, the 
arrangement of working times at enterprise level within the framework of a sectoral 
agreement, also demonstrates the potential for conflict. Trade unions have supported a 
policy of shorter working hours as a means of stimulating job creation. This has, however, 
led to tension between trade unions and works councils because it implies a reduction of 
overtime and overtime pay which works council members find it difficult to support. 96   
Summers argues that, although the vast majority of works council members are also unions 
members, their primary loyalty is towards the employees at the workplace; as a result they 
do not feel 'rigidly bound' by union policies. 97 
These examples illustrate the forms of inherent strain between trade unions and workplace 
structures which South African unions appear to be apprehensive about. Even in the 
absence of employer intervention, the immediate pressures and demands upon workplace 
structures may impel them in directions at variance with union policy and detract from the 
union's ability to pursue its broader aims. The position of the unions in South Africa is 
compounded by their relative organizational weakness and the relative autonomy of shop 
stewards' committees in many workplaces. Whereas in Germany the problem might be 
limited to manageable proportions, unions in South Africa are evidently less confident of 
their ability to contain it. 
(c) The Netherlands 
There are about 8 000 to 9 000 works councils in Holland. Some works councils organize 
their elections on the basis of electoral lists which include trade union lists. In general, a 
high proportion of candidates are union members. 98   Recent research has shown that 
about 50-55% of works council members are union members. But 15% of employees 
interviewed did not know which of their works council members were also union members, 
which means that the real 
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percentage is probably close to 60%. 99   And, as in Germany, many active trade union 
members are works council members. 100 
The relationship between trade unions and works councils in the Netherlands, as elsewhere, 
is characterized by a combination of tension and cooperation. 101   A trade union lawyer 
comments: 
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 'The relationship works council-trade union has a loaded history. Although a mindshift is noticeable, many trade 
union representatives, especially in traditional sectors like the metal and building industries, see the works 
council as competition or as a threat to the position of the trade union. As a result the declarations of intent at 
a central level, where the trade union welcomes a bigger role for works councils, are not always very 
meaningful at lower levels. On numerous occasions it has been pointed out that trade union representatives are 
often selected from their own ranks, which slows down the penetration of new ideas. Outsiders who could bring 
a breath of fresh air into the trade union get little chance, and as a result old concepts only change slowly.' 102 
The predominant trend, however, is towards increasing cooperation. As in Germany, works 
councils are heavily dependent on the practical assistance that trade unions are able to 
offer. This arises not so much from the unions' legal powers over councils as from works 
councils' need for union support in areas such as training and expert advice. 103   
Conversely, trade unions have discovered the strategically important role that works 
councils can play: 
 'In the context of the Netherlands we say that we need the works councils, because they provide us with a legal 
foothold in the enterprise. Also as a trade union, in order to enable our members in those firms to exercise their 
influence as works council members. As a trade union we cannot deliver customized negotiations in each and 
every enterprise, and we're less and less able to reach detailed agreement at the sectoral level. Increasingly it 
all boils down to differentiation, depending on the particular position in which the enterprise finds itself.' 104 
Or, as Slomp puts it: 
 '[T]he unions couldn't function very well if they didn't have a clear connection with the works councils. If they 
had no connection with the works councils, you'd have to join the union merely because it bargained at industry 
level. That would motivate very few people to join a union.' 105 
Moreover works councils, in contrast to trade unions, have a legal right to information. 106   
Works councils are therefore an important source of information for unions: 
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 'Unions are dependent, when negotiating, on what they know of an enterprise and of the various industries. 
And works councils can inform the unions very well about problems in enterprises, about solutions etc. . . . You 
therefore see that unions convene meetings of works council members in a particular enterprise or sector to 
exchange ideas about automation, new technology and all the developments which flow from that.' 107 
While both institutions thus derive benefit from their association, trade unions are clearly 
the dominant partners. Contrary to the frequently expressed view in South Africa that 
workplace forums represent a 'more powerful version of the shopstewards' committee', 108   
it is evident in the Netherlands that the contrary is true: 
 'It's clear that the trade union movement, being organized at a level higher than the individual enterprise, will 
have more insight into industrial relations, into what is happening in the sector as a whole. It has considerable 
resources, it has its own staff, it can deploy expertise, all of which works councils in themselves don't dispose 
over. Unless they can engage experts from outside, at the company's expense. That is provided for in the 
Works Councils Act. So, in organizational terms, a trade union will generally be far more powerful than a works 
council. More powerful in terms of expertise as well as a more independent position in relation to the enterprise. 
And with more insight into developments elsewhere in the economy. That is why we maintain that trade union 
membership is extremely important also for works council members. Because one can fall back on a whole 
system of expertise and training.' 109 
The Director of the Centre for Works Councils elaborates: 
 'The most important thing about a trade union is that it can embody the principle of solidarity far better than a 
works council. A works council can also do it, but not beyond the limits of the enterprise. And they hardly do so 
in practice. The trade union looks beyond the limits of enterprises, promotes equal treatment, equal positions of 
employees in the labour market. . . . That is something which the works councils will not address because they 
are enterprise based.' 110 
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It is, indeed, the relative weakness of workplace based structures which render them 
potentially more pliable bargaining partners for employers and, hence, a potential threat to 
trade unions. Rather than competing, trade union structures 111   at workplace level in the 
Netherlands are said to 'stimulate' works councils by serving as a channel of communication 
between the union and the latter. 112 
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The trend towards practical cooperation is illustrated by the growing incidence of 
'framework' collective bargaining agreements in which the social partners determine the 
extent of the powers which they devolve to consultation between employer and works 
council. 113 
In addition, collective agreements have been signed in the information technology sector 
where on the side of the employees both works councils and trade unions were present. The 
employee position had been worked out in collaboration. 114 
This process has undoubtedly created areas of potential overlap and tension. Instances have 
occurred where the employer refused to negotiate with a trade union but turned to the 
works council instead. One such case was in the civil engineering industry: 
 'About two years ago the service sector unions of the FNV and CNV were busy negotiating collective agreements 
in the civil engineering sector and found it very difficult to get into a particular workplace. Trade union 
membership in that workplace had risen to 30 or 35 per cent while in the sector as a whole it was about five 
per cent. So, at the request of the workforce, the unions were trying to sign a collective agreement. In this case 
the employer used the works council to keep the union out. That led the unions to start legal proceedings on 
the basis that the arrangements between the employer and the works council gave the works council a 
consultative status more or less equivalent to that of a trade union, which was in conflict with the law - with the 
Works Council Act as well as international conventions - and also in conflict with the standards of the good 
employer. The unions lost the case. The judge said that in s 32 of the Works Councils Act, which deals with 
additional capacities forworks councils, there was nothing to prevent it from including primary conditions of 
employment. That was one of the few cases where a trade union and a works council really found themselves in 
a legal conflict situation.' 115 
This dispute led to serious conflict within the works council and between the works council 
and its constituency. In the end the works council ceased to exist due to lack of motivation 
on the part of its members to continue. This case is generally seen as cause cèlébre of how 
it should not be done. 116 
Another example was at Fuji Films, where the conditions of employment likewise were fixed 
in an agreement with the works council (the so-called 'Fuji labour agreement'). The trade 
unions did not play a role in reaching this agreement. In contrast to the civil engineering 
case, trade union membership at Fuji was very low (approximately 1%), and as a result the 
position of the trade unions vis-à-vis Fuji was weak. 117 
Santberg reviews the emerging pattern: 
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 'A tendency of the last few years is that works councils are more and more concerned with conditions of 
employment. Traditionally that is the territory of the trade unions. But in an enterprise where no collective 
agreement is applicable, it may be the case that the employer in practice imposes terms of employment 
unilaterally. In such cases you often see the employer consulting with the works council because he wants the 
employees to be committed to his decision. You also see in sectors which have a collective agreement that not 
all the details are filled in, and that further consultation is needed to fill them in. More and more works councils 
become involved with this. It is a growing tendency, that we can see from the questions we get. At the central 
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level the agreements become more and more general, people want to work out the specifics at enterprise level. 
One enterprise is not like another, even if they are in the same sector.' 118 
(d) Belgium 
In 1995, 3 041 collective agreements were registered with the Ministry of Labour. Five were 
concluded in the NLC, 837 in the Joint Labour-Management Committees and 2 199 at 
enterprise level. A breakdown based on topics discerns the following categories: wages and 
working conditions, meal vouchers, end of year bonus, other bonuses, restructuring, early 
retirement, collective dismissal, representation of employees, social elections, working time, 
reduction of working time, new working time regulations, shift work, part-time work, 
long-term unemployed, redistribution of available work, promotion of employment and 
social funds. 119 
This wide range of bargaining topics demonstrates the effect of enterprise level collective 
bargaining: issues dealt with by works councils in the Netherlands and Germany are 
adopted as part of the bargaining agenda. Collective bargaining functions more visibly as 
the primary channel of interaction between management and labour, with consultation and 
joint decision making in the role of 'second channel'. The union delegation is seen as the 
most strategically important representative body as it is responsible for concluding company 
level collective agreements, handling grievances and generally conducting industrial 
relations at this level. In most cases it is the focus of union activities and its members are 
often also works councillors or members of the CPPW (health and safety committees), thus 
enjoying full legal protection. 120 
The works councils, in contrast, are generally seen as being concerned with day-to-day 
matters rather than strategic matters. They are, however, important bodies in many larger 
companies and the legal protection granted to their members is seen as providing a 
guarantee for union organization. 121 
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The manifest presence of the trade unions in the enterprise ensures almost complete 
dominance over the works council. 122   The election of representatives of leading 
personnel ('cadres'), 123   however, is regarded as a more accurate measure for gauging 
the trade union federations' level of support since it is the only election where they do not 
have a monopoly in putting forward candidates. In the 1987 elections the cadres' union NCK 
and the independent 'house lists' won a resounding victory. This trend was, however, not 
continued in 1991 and 1995, when the three traditional confederations won a majority of 
seats in the election of cadres. 124 
 
 
Conclusions 
Coexistence between trade unions and works councils in the European context is not 
unproblematical but demonstrates advantages for trade unions, works councils and 
employees. In South Africa a more entrenched level of adversarialism presents an additional 
barrier which is easier for employers than trade unions to overcome. Non-statutory 
structures appear to present fewer problems from both employers' and unions' points of 
view. The key to promoting a more favourable climate for employee participation by means 
of workplace forums would seem to lie in addressing trade union concerns without 
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transforming workplace forums into organs of industrial conflict. In this context 
consideration can be given to the following reforms: 
 1 Consultation and joint decision making by workplace forums should be excluded 
over matters regulated by collective agreement as well as matters normally subject 
to collective bargaining. 
 2 The primacy of collective bargaining and the exclusion of consultation and joint 
decision making in respect of matters normally subject to collective bargaining 
should be included in the objects clause of chapter V of the LRA (s 79). 
 3 The scope for representative trade unions to be involved in regulatory functions at 
workplace level could possibly be defined in line with the Belgian precedent. 
 4 Trade unions could be encouraged to address the needs of their members at 
workplace level more systematically, for example, by providing funding in terms of 
the Skills Development Act for training provided to members of workplace forums 
or non-statutory participatory structures. 
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